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Information Security Threats and Policies in Europe
CASE STUDY
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-=- and security of the Internet have
=- :-11 recent years, as Internet-based
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=a suffered a massive cyber attack
= ;:,overnmerit, the banking system,
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=:.::ddistributed denial of service
~ackers coordinated the attack by
ner of compromised servers orga-
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~ commanded to carry out the
-;r'. on Estonia started in late April
-= ~ :- a.Jnost 3 weeks. During this
-= 0:the Estonian Internet network
- =- =am access from outside the coun-
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-= - e time, Arsys, an important
:c::'s;::rarion company, was also tar-
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_==:::o<ie that were then used to
_ :="';"..:: ~--:::.:,' ;;-r:=- ~\-ere among the
_~ -" ;;::=-zered. :-he mo - infection .
was infected. In the UK, the worm infected comput-
ers in the Ministry of Defense, the city of
Manchester's city council and police IT network,
sOf!le hospitals in the city of Sheffield, and other gov-
ernment offices across the country. Computers in
the network of the German army were also reported
as infected. Once installed on a computer, Conflicker •..
is able to download and install other malware from
controlled Web sites, thus infected computers could
be under full control of the hackers.
More recently, a sophisticated mal ware threat tar-
geting industrial systems was detected in Germany,
Norway, China, Iran, India, Indonesia, and other
countries. The malware, known as Stuxnet, infected
Windows PCs running the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) control system from the
German company Siemens. Stuxnet was propagated
via USB devices. Experts estimate that up to 1,000
machines were infected on a daily basis at the peak
of the infection. The malware, hidden in shortcuts to
executable programs (files with extension .Ink), was
executed automatically when the content of an
infected USB drive was displayed. Employing this
same technique, the worm was capable of installing
other malware. Initially, security experts disclosed
that Stuxnet was designed to steal industrial secrets
from SIMATIC WinCC, a visualization and control
software system from Siemens. However, data gath-
ered later by other experts indicates that the worm
was actually looking for some specific Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC) devices used in a specific
industrial plant, a fact that points to the possibility
that the malware was part of a well-planned act of
sabotage. Even though none of the sites infected with
Stuxnet suffered physical damage, the significance
that such a sophisticated threat represents to the
industrial resources in Europe and other parts of the
world cannot be underestimated.
As of 2001, EU member states had independent
groups of experts that were responsible for respond-
ing to incidents in information security. These
groups lacked coordination and did not exchange
much information. To overcome this, in 2004 the
European Commission established the European
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
with the goal of coordinating efforts to prevent and
respond more effectively to potentially more harmful
ecurity threats. ENISA's main objectives are to
